October 26, 1999
The following comments on the above-referenced document (hereinafter "Draft") are submitted by:
Lanny Sinkin
58 Furneaux Lane, Suite 5
Hilo, Hawai`i 96720
(808) 961-9100
light@ilhawaii.net
These comments are not offered with any expectation that the United States Navy will reconsider the decision made long ago to deploy the SURTASS LFA system. Those assigned the role of decision-makers by the Illuminati know their script well and cannot be expected to divert from the ordered path.
Of course, there is always the possibility of a principled act, choosing the sustenance of integrity over the continued career path of deception. There is practically no likelihood, however, that such a principled individual could convince the real decision-makers to reverse course on this project.
This observation is not a general criticism of the Illuminati (or National Security State or whatever moniker makes the reader comfortable). They perform their functions of control as a service to the human experiment.
The deliberate ignoring of scientifically significant evidence to reach a pre-ordained conclusion is, however, symptomatic of those decision-makers having reached a level of covetousness that has created a significant psychic imbalance on this planet. While this imbalance will be corrected soon, the time for reintegration of the Illuminati into the sphere of ethical action will be shortened by any act outside the boundaries of the script for SURTASS LFA, if that act stands as a repudiation of the excess represented by this program.
Rather than an effort to reverse the decision to deploy SURTASS LFA, these comments are offered in gratitude to the whales, dolphins, turtles, and other marine creatures that have given so much to the human experiment and deserve so much better treatment than humans currently offer. The unconditional love found in marine mammals contrasts so clearly with the fear, manipulation, and control sought by those enmeshed in a conflict mentality.
These comments are also offered as a contribution to the ultimate obsolescence of the human conflict mentality. We will know that change has reached even the heart of the military when we see all the alternatives to a system such as SURTASS LFA discussed.
One alternative not considered at all in the Draft OEIS/EIS is the pursuit of peace. There is no discussion of an approach which would identify those countries still developing quiet submarines and development of an approach that would discourage those countries from pursuing that development through peaceful means, such an improving relations, providing financial assistance, or otherwise reducing tensions through negotiations.
1.1. Illegal Development of SURTASS LFA.
The Draft's Executive Summary states: "The Navy is carrying out this OEIS/EIS process with the full intent and spirit of all applicable laws and regulations."
This statement ignores the actual history of the development of this system.
The Draft admits that the Navy considered the detection of quiet submarines a challenge in the 1980s. Draft at 1-5. The Draft further admits that the Navy evaluated various technologies and selected low frequency active (LFA) sonar for such detection as early as 1987. Ibid. at 1-8. That decision evolved into development of the SURTASS LFA.
The notice of intent to prepare an OEIS/EIS, however, appeared in the Federal Register on July 18, 1996. Ibid. at 1-10. This publication is notice of an intent to prepare an OEIS/EIS for "the operational employment of the SURTASS LFA system." 61 FR 37452 (1996) (emphasis added).
The chart in the Draft regarding evaluation of alternatives to low frequency sonar, Draft at 1-6,7, is the kind of analysis one would expect to find in an EIS examining alternatives to development of SURTASS LFA, not deployment. Indeed, that analysis took place more than ten years ago and is only now being published. The Navy did not prepare an EIS for development of this system.
During the period of time between the decision to develop an LFA system and the notification of an intent to prepare an OEIS/EIS for deployment, the Navy engaged in "systematic Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation of SURTASS LFA." Draft at 1-8. This program included more than twenty field tests of the LFA prior to the notice of intent to prepare an OEIS/EIS. See e.g. "LFA-13 Environmental Review," 10 May 1995 Department of the Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Washington, D.C. [Redacted Version: October 1996] at 1 ("[These exercises] represent the 23rd in a series of exercises involving this type of LFAA transmission.")
The Navy is proud of their extensive testing program. Draft at 2-11 ("As a result of lengthy experience, constantly improving techniques, and routine nature of ASW [anti-submarine warfare] operations, the US Navy is very good at determining the underwater propagation of low frequency sound.")
Throughout that period of time, the Navy acted in violation of numerous environmental laws. The Navy was well aware of its obligations to prepare at least an OEIS for the SURTASS LFA long before the preparation of the current document began. Rather than prepare such a document under conditions permitting public review, the Navy adopted an internal process which kept their activities out of public view by using a self serving evaluation that concluded that there were no environmental impacts. See e.g. "LFA-13 Environmental Review," supra.; see also "Environmental Assessment of the Magellan II Exercise in the North Eastern Pacific Ocean" (hereinafter "Magellan II") dated June 21, 1994, Department of the Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
The manner in which the Navy concealed its activities suggests a deliberate policy.
The Navy knew that broadcasts of SURTASS LFA caused whales to stop singing. Magellan II at 35 ("typically the vocalizations [of marine mammals] cease during the LFAA transmissions and resume shortly thereafter." (emphasis in original).) Given the importance of vocalization to marine mammals, particularly whales and dolphins, the disruption of vocalizations obviously suggested a potentially harmful environmental effect requiring a formal level of scrutiny pursuant to environmental laws.
The Navy conducted broadcasts in waters off the United States and remained outside the three mile limit to avoid complying with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. Ibid. at 37 ("NEPA applies to Federal actions that have an effect within U.S. territorial waters. Magellan II activities will occur well beyond the three mile territorial limit and the impact, if any, of the exercise within territorial waters is expected to be negligible.")
The Navy did recognize that Executive Order 12114 still required an environmental analysis and claimed to satisfy that requirement by the environmental review prepared for the earlier studies. See e.g. Ibid. at 37.
The Navy avoided applying for permits required to harass marine mammals by assuming the tests would not be likely to have such an effect. Id. ("the Navy has not applied for an incidental take of marine mammals in connection with MAGELLAN II ... [because] the likelihood of an incidental take of marine mammals due to the conduct of this exercise is extremely small and MAGELLAN II would have a negligible impact, if any, on the overall population of any marine mammal species."); Ibid. at 38 ("The Navy has not applied for a letter of authorization for the incidental take of endangered or threatened species in connection with MAGELLAN II ... [because] the likelihood of a take is considered negligible."); Ibid at 39 ("The Navy has not consulted with California state officials concerning MAGELLAN II.")
Basically, the Navy relied upon mitigation measures adopted for the LFAA tests to prevent any harm to marine life, made a self serving assumption that their measures would be effective, and then used their unreviewed assumption as a basis to minimize their need to comply with applicable laws.
The Navy also ignored repeated calls even internally to conduct further research into the effects of LFA on marine mammals. See e.g. "Potential Impact on and Responses of Baleen Whales to Low Frequency Transients; Seasonal and Geographic Distributions, Biological Considerations," A Report Submitted by: Dr. Christopher W. Clark to Marine Acoustics, Inc. dated September 17, 1990 at 16 (Lack of information on auditory threshold for whales, time spent at different depths, acoustics behaviors at depth, and perceptions of differences and similarities between species specific and man made signals); Magellan II, Appendix A at H (Any discussion of expected impacts on marine life of low frequency broadcasts is speculative.); "LFA-13 Environmental Review," Appendix A at A-5 (repeats same need for research found in Magellan II one year earlier).
One result of this approach by the Navy was an environmental assessment which prevented outside observers from commenting on the inadequacy of the Navy's internal environmental review. Once the process was open to scrutiny, research into how LFA affects whales was identified as a matter of urgency. TR1 at 1.
1.2. Illegal Expenditure of Funds on Development of SURTASS LFA.
The Executive Summary states that the Navy adopted a charter for the OEIS/EIS process with five basic principles. Draft at ES-5. One of those principles is "acceptance criteria established that included the possibility of a conclusion recommending the No Action Alternative." Id.
In addition to pursuing the development of SURTASS LFA in violation of environmental laws, the Navy expended considerable resources in that pursuit. One estimate of expenditures through mid-1998 is $100 million, which includes the construction of a ship to carry the SURTASS LFA equipment. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction dated June 2, 1998 at 2-4, Hawai`i County Green Party v. William Jefferson Clinton, et al., No. CV98-000232 (ACK), In the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i.
[NOTE: The law suit referenced is one of four law suits filed against the Navy and other defendants in federal courts in Hawaii in February and March of 1998. The other three cases are: Kanoa Inc. dba Body Glove Cruises v. William Jefferson Clinton, et al., No. CV98-00250 (DAE); Harry Fergerstrom, Member of Na Koa O Pu'u Kohola Heiau (Warriors of the Temple on the Mound of the Whale) v. United States Navy, No. CV98-00212; and Ocean Mammal Institute et al. v. William Cohen et al., No. CV98-00160 (HG). These comments incorporate by reference all pleadings and evidence filed in all of those cases. The Navy, as a defendant, had notice of all such argument and evidence prior to preparing the Draft.]
A more recent estimate is that the expenditures to date are $350 million. "Navy Sonar System Draws Activists' Fire," Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1999.
The Draft states that a second SURTASS LFA system "is expected to be operational in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000." Draft at 2-7. Obviously investment in this system even beyond what was needed to test the system has already been made and continues to be made. The investment in a second system and a ship to carry that system are investments assuming deployment.
The intent of the National Environmental Policy Act is that proposed actions be evaluated prior to the irreversible commitment of resources. 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C)(v). The Navy's expenditures to date represent a huge irreversible expenditure of resources prior to the completion of an EIS. These expenditures were illegal.
The purpose of foreclosing irreversible expenditures prior to assessing environmental impacts is to prevent the momentum of prior, unrecoverable expenditures from influencing a decision on whether the proposed action should be taken or influencing the choice of one alternative over other alternatives. See e.g. 50 C.F.R. Section 401.09 (no irretrievable or irreversible commitment of resources which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternatives which would avoid violating the Endangered Species Act).
Obviously, one alternative essentially foreclosed by the massive expenditures on SURTASS LFA to date is the "No Action Alternative." In order to adopt that alternative, the Navy would have to conclude that the Navy made a mistake by investing hundreds of millions of dollars in this system. Such a decision could well jeopardize the careers of those who authorized the investment in violation of environmental laws. This situation is exactly what the law forbidding irretrievable investments prior to environmental evaluation is designed to avoid.
The extensive investment of irretrievable resources is another factor calling into question the objectivity of the OEIS/EIS process.
The Draft ignores this prior investment by making no mention of the funds expended on this system to date.
The Draft even pretends such investment has not taken place. In the section on Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources, the Draft states: "While implementing the SURTASS LFA sonar system would provide important benefits ..., nonrenewable resources would be consumed during the design, construction, and operation of the proposed system." Draft at 9-1 (emphasis added).
The SURTASS LFA is not a "proposed system." The system is developed to the point of deployment.
While the statement admits that design and construction involve expenditure of retrievable resources, the use of the phrase "would be consumed" implies that those expenditures have not yet taken place.
Certainly the Navy had a difficult time trying to avoid admitting the violations of law found in the expenditures to date. Calling the system a "proposed system" and pretending that any expenditures will only take place at some future point is, however, deliberately deceptive.
The development of the system in violation of relevant laws and the illegal expenditure of funds raise serious concerns about the objectivity of the Draft. The Draft's treatment of those past actions as if they never happened is evidence that concerns about objectivity are well founded.
A more honest expression regarding deployment is found in the declaration of Captain Neil E. Rondorf, U.S. Navy wherein Captain Rondorf stated: "The U.S. Navy has identified the SURTASS LFA sonar as a critically important national security system."
Such statements are clearly designed to foreclose any potential reviewer, such as a judge, from examining the wisdom of the deployment decision. Having locked themselves into SURTASS LFA as the only option for detecting quiet submarines and into the assumption that threat still exists in the post-Cold War arena, the Navy fully intends to deploy that system.
1.3 Response to Getting Caught
The illegal development of and investment in SURTASS LFA continued until the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) discovered the Navy to be on the verge of deployment in 1995 and notified the Navy of NRDC's intent to take legal action forcing compliance with environmental laws. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit 1, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.
When an agency commits to preparing an EIS only after having been caught violating environmental laws and investing heavily for an extended period of time, that commitment is already placed under a cloud. The Draft should, therefore, reflect the highest standards of integrity.
As will be seen below, this Draft fails to meet those standards.
1.4. Lack of Scientific Rigor in the OEIS/EIS process.
Another of the five principles supposedly governing the Draft OEIS/EIS was a commitment to "[m]aintain scientific rigor throughout the development of the OEIS/EIS." Unfortunately, lack of scientific rigor is a characteristic of the entire OEIS/EIS process.
1.4.1 The tests conducted off the Island of Hawai`i lacked a baseline of whale locations prior to the initiation of testing and lacked adequate monitoring of whale locations during testing.
After getting caught by NRDC, the Navy funded its Low Frequency Sound Scientific Research Program (LFS SRP). Draft at 2-26.
As part of the LFS SRP, scientists conducted tests of the effects of SURTASS LFA in three phases. See Overseas Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Statement for Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) Sonar, Technical Report 1 (hereinafter "TR1").
The first phase studied the responses of feeding Blue or Fin Whales to LFA broadcasts off San Nicholas Island, California. TR1 at 2
The second phase studied the responses of migrating Gray Whales to LFA broadcasts off Point Buchon, California. Id.
The third phase studied the response of Humpback Whales in their breeding and calving season off the Island of Hawai`i. Id.
The author is based in Hawai`i and was directly involved in monitoring the third phase. These comments will, therefore, address primarily that phase with the confidence that others commenting will address Phases I and II.
Phase III involved studying effects of SURTASS LFA on Humpback Whale populations off Hawai`i. Phase III did not include an aerial survey or other identification of whale locations prior to the tests.
Phase III did have access to an aerial survey. The survey data, however, was not available during the testing period unless specifically requested. TR1 at 95, Figures D-29-31; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.; Defense Exhibit 17, Paragraph 4 (Declaration of Eugene T. Nitta), Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.
The survey results showing distribution of whales within and outside the testing area were not available until after the testing ended in March 1998. "1998 Aerial Survey Results for Island of Hawaii Sightings of Humpback Whales," Prepared by Joseph R. Mobley, Jr., Ph.D., Professor, University of Hawaii - West Oahu dated April 30, 1998 (preliminary report - author's personal copy).
The absence of aerial surveys from the Hawaii testing program is important, in part, because the permit for that testing included the following provision:
6. Source transmission shall be suspended immediately if an acute behavioral response (e.g. repeated/prolonged activity (vocalizations, breaching, blowing, time on surface, etc.), potential injurious activity, abnormal number of animals present or absent in the area, abnormal mother-calf activity, or erratic swimming behavior of pennipeds, small cetaceans, or sea turtles) by a marine mammal or sea turtle is detected."
Defense Exhibit 11 at 10, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.
The scientists acknowledge that "[s]ound, particularly low-frequency sound, propagates very efficiently underwater so there is reason to be concerned about the potential large-scale effects of low-frequency sources on marine mammals." TR1 at 1. One underlying thesis of the SRP was that effects on whales could take place "up to approximately tens of kilometers." Ibid. at 20.
Given the permit requirement to monitor the number of whales in the test area and their own understanding of a potential for generalized effects, the SRP scientists should have implemented a program to detect and respond to such generalized effects, as well as the program to detect focal whale effects.
In order to determine whether the number of whales in the testing area and adjacent waters was changing in response to the testing, a preliminary aerial survey or other identification of whale locations would be necessary. Also necessary would be comprehensive surveys of whale locations available during the testing period.
In Phase I, the scientists conducted eleven aerial surveys of whale locations preliminary to, during, and after the test broadcasts. TR1 at 6, 41.
Similar surveys should have been included in Phase III.
The failure to include similar surveys in the Phase III test design constituted a major flaw in the testing program. This failure precluded the scientists from determining the locations of whales when reports of whales leaving the test area began.
Without the aerial surveys, the scientists relied solely upon ship and shore observations. TR1 at 104-108. The task of shore-based operations was to track both the movements of individual whales and distribution. Ibid. at 4, 104. The focus of activity for the observation vessel was following individual whales, not observing total whale population in the test area. Ibid. at 8. The SRP test design had no means of locating whales outside the test area.
The SRP Phase III, therefore, lacked comprehensive aerial survey data prior to and during testing and relied on land or ship observers who were busy following individual whales.
Far more was necessary. As the lead scientists for the technical report had earlier stated:
"We believe that observations from circling aircraft or ship platforms are inadequate for providing the necessary information [on whale responses to LFAA] as they are ... extremely susceptible to weather and ocean conditions."
"Potential Impact on and Responses of Baleen Whales to Low Frequency Transients; Seasonal and Geographic Distributions, Biological Considerations," A Report Submitted by: Dr. Christopher W. Clark to Marine Acoustics, Inc. dated September 17, 1990 at 16 (emphasis added).
The scientists did have a resource available to improve their monitoring capability - whale watch boat captains. Yet the SRP made no effort to enlist captains of such boats in the research program.
The monitoring of whale distribution within and outside the testing area clearly lacked scientific rigor.
1.4.2. The Phase III testing did not include monitoring of dolphin behavior.
The Phase III permit required suspending the testing if erratic swimming behavior of small cetaceans occurred. Defense Exhibit 11 at 10, Hawaii County Green Party, supra. The Phase III testing program did not include any effort to monitor the behavior of dolphins.
This failure precluded the scientists from making any evidentiary response when evidence of abnormal dolphin behavior surfaced. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit 25, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.
1.4.3. During Phase III, the scientists made no effort to follow up on reported adverse impacts of SURTASS LFA.
During Phase III, numerous whale watch boat captains and other observers reported whales leaving the testing area beginning the first week of March 1998, the same time the testing began. See e.g. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibits 7-20, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra.
The Draft acknowledges that whale watching is one activity which could be affected by SURTASS LFA. Draft at 3.3-7.
Yet, the scientists made no effort to contact any of those reporting the abnormal absence of whales from the test area. The number of reports, the cumulative experience in spotting whales of those reporting, and the supposed purpose of the tests made such follow up imperative to good science. The absence of any such follow up calls into question the integrity of the SRP and its commitment to examine the evidence objectively.
During Phase III, a snorkeler filed declarations from herself and a doctor reporting traumatic effects from exposure to a SURTASS LFA broadcast. See e.g. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibits 25 and 26, Hawai`i County Green Party, supra. The acting Chief Scientists of the SRP admitted that a broadcast took place at the time and in the area of the snorkeler's claimed exposure. Ibid., Exhibit 28 at para. 3.
The scientists made no effort to contact either the snorkeler or her doctor. Nor did the scientists attempt to arrange a physical examination of the snorkeler or otherwise determine her condition. The absence of any such follow up calls into question the integrity of the SRP and its commitment to examine the evidence objectively.
These two examples are only part of the evidence submitted in the Hawaiian law suits. To the best of the author's knowledge, neither the scientists, the Navy, or anyone else associated with the preparation of the Draft made any attempt to follow up with any of the witnesses filing declarations as part of plaintiffs' cases. To simply ignore such potential evidence demonstrates a lack of commitment to scientific rigor in the research program and a lack of objectivity in the OEIS/EIS program.
1.4.4. The LFS SRP observations of individual whales was inadequate.
As noted above, see Section 1.C.(1), the Phase III tests focused on the responses of individual whales to LF broadcasts. TR1 at 4, 8, 104-108. Even in these observations, there was at least one major deficiency.
One item from the Hawaiian evidence that the SRP team is willing to mention is the observation by the Ocean Mammal Institute staff of a lone Humpback Whale calf separated from its mother. TR1 at 104; see also "Impacts of SURTASS LFA Testing, Hawai`i - March 1998" (Sinkin 1998) at 6-7, Exhibit 10.
(NOTE: This document is a report prepared by the author for a meeting convened by the U.S. Navy in June 1998 and is discussed further in Section 1.5. below.)
The SRP shore station "was set up to monitor inshore mothers and calves in case they responded to distant playbacks at lower received levels than the offshore singers selected for playback." TR1 at 104. The SRP shore team, however, did not see this calf, despite the special focus of the shore observation team on following mother-calf pairs. Id. ("we did not observe any separated calves during March 1998").
In a scientific study where (1) the target population is breeding and calving Humpback Whales, (2) the target population is an endangered species, (3) the species is at risk in part because of their low reproductive rate, and (4) the possibility of greater impacts on mothers and calves is acknowledged prior to the testing, the failure of the SRP team to observe a calf separated from its mother is another measure of the inadequacy of the LFS SRP.
The SRP shore observers did see calves breaching in the presence of their mothers. As the technical report records, the number of breaches by the OMI-observed, separated calf greatly exceeded the maximum number of breaches by the SRP-observed, accompanied calves. Id. (OMI: average 40/hour for 5 hours vs. SRP: 36/hour for 3 hours).
The SRP team agrees that the separation of the calf from its mother "would be a highly unusual event under normal circumstances." Id.
The SRP team suggests that younger whales may be more sensitive to LFA. Ibid. at 9.
Yet the SRP team does not consider the possibility that LF broadcasts resulted in the OMI-observed calf reacting by separating from its mother, with that separation subsequently leading to calf behavior indicative of great stress. Nor does the SRP team consider the possibility that the separated calf may have died. Both these possibilities are certainly within the realm of scientific probability and at least deserved to be considered.
Return to LFAS Litigation Index